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2ABSTRACT
The emergence of electronic commerce complexes raises important questions
regarding competence building and leveraging, both for practitioners and strategy
scholars.  Competences of brick-and-mortar incumbents (large and mature players)
are being challenged by new entrants’ click-and-mortar or click-and-click business
models.   The implications of  this challenge for the financial services industry – as
for many other industries – are only starting to become clear.   In this paper we
contribute to these initial understandings by developing a conceptual framework that
considers which strategies incumbents and new entrants might adopt to improve their
competitiveness.   We identify four relevant organizational types in the emerging on-
line financial services complex.  For each of these types we outline how ties to
sponsoring organizations can be used as a buffer against environmental turbulence
and as a bridge towards changing stakeholder perspectives.
Keywords :   e-  commerce, competence building and leveraging, co-evolution,
legitimacy, on-line financial services complex
3Introduction
The convergence of e-commerce technologies based on Internet-standards is causing a
fundamental shift in the way businesses operate by creating new markets, blurring
industry boundaries, and redefining the meaning of products (Rayport & Sviokla,
1994, 1995; De Boer et al., 1999; Botten & McManus, 1999; Yoffie, 1997). Today’s
“brick-and-mortar” companies find themselves confronted with new business
opportunities in a virtual marketspace of processual information interactions, as
opposed to a marketplace of physical resources and institutionalized interactions
(Castells, 1996; Rayport & Sviokla, 1994; 1995).   New e-commerce complexes are
emerging in which brick-and-mortar incumbents of a main originating industry
compete with new entrants using new business models – be it “click-and-mortar” or
“click-and-click” companies.
To be succesful in an emerging e-commerce complex, incumbents and new entrants
have to clear some liabilities that hold them back (Stinchcombe, 1965).  Incumbents
suffer from the liability of oldness, as they tend to develop up to the limit of their
adaptive competence.  New entrants on the contrary suffer from the liability of
newness, since at the point of founding an organization the risk of dying is highest.
Which liability will lay the heaviest burden, causing either incumbents or new
entrants to get the upper hand?  How should either party build competences to
outperform the other?  In this paper we try to give an answer to these questions by
developing a simple framework that describes how new entrants and incumbents in
4the banking industry influence each other and reciprocally evolve – co-evolve – to
create an on-line financial services complex.  By focusing on dynamic processes
rather than random indications of the current state of affairs, this framework enables
us to see the co-evolution of managerial actions and environmental phenomena in an
emerging e-commerce complex in its right perspective (Lewin & Volberda, 1999).
The paper is structured as follows. First, we explain why research in the financial
services industry is highly interesting in light of the emergence of e-commerce
complexes.  Secondly, we elaborate a basic framework of competence leveraging and
building strategies for incumbents and new entrants.  We complement this framework
by contrasting the managerial perspectives of either party with regards to the current
e-commerce evolutions in the financial services industry.  Subsequently, we outline
how incumbents and new entrants can use the lever of “sponsoring” organizations to
outdo each other, resulting in three key propositions.   Finally, we conclude this paper
by enumerating the most important lessons managers of well established and new
entrant firms should learn in order to be succesful in the emerging on-line financial
services industry.
The emerging on-line financial services complex
Our focus is on the emergence of an on-line financial services complex.  There are
several reasons why we chose financial services. The banking industry is a mature
industry which is facing increasing environmental turbulence.  It has long been
subject to strong institutional control and been protected by high entry barriers (Scott,
1998).  However, deregulation and the increasing importance of ICT are leading to
5the deconstruction of entry barriers.  Even scale economies are not a substantial
barrier to entry anymore for new entrants since succesful Internet banking is grounded
in flexible processes rather than mere economies of scale (Canals, 1999; Llewellyn,
1999). What is more, operating expenses of electronic banking services are estimated
to amount to only 25 to 30 percent of the cost of providing traditional banking
services through existing bank branch offices (Klinkerman, 1996).  Finally, customer
awareness about bank products is soaring (Llewelynn, 1999, Essinger, 1998).
New entrants could well take advantage of that fact by imposing new and disruptive
ways of competing to incumbents (Porter, 1996).  Therefore, many banking industry
analysts believe the power in the channel of retail financial services will shift very
soon to innovative new entrants able to offer a more attractive and efficient consumer
banking interface (Clark & Lee, 1998).  But then again, other analysts predict
national-historical protection and preferences are likely to favour incumbents, and
delay change (Walter, 1999). For institutional constituents like the media, customers
and government are likely to trust their crucial resources to more legitimate
organizations in the emerging on-line financial services complex.  That is, well
respected banks or insurance companies.
How should new entrant and incumbent firms evolve to get the upper hand? Apart
from offering technically superior services, new entrants need to develop strategies
encompassing on the one hand the establishment of extra-organizational, legitimating
ties to the institutional apparatus and on the other hand the de-institutionalization of
incumbents.  Likewise, to counter new entrants’ claims for legitimacy incumbents
need to adapt the nature of their extra-organizational ties to the demands of the
6changing environment.  In this way the rationale underlying both incumbents’ and
new entrants’ strategies involves the manipulation to their advantage of the legitimacy
criteria employed by institutional constituents (Oliver, 1992).
A basic framework for new and old
The aim of this paper is to describe how incumbent and new entrant managers can
build and leverage competences that are viable and legitimate in an emerging on-line
financial services complex.  We define a competence as the ability of a firm to sustain
the coordinated deployment of assets in a way that helps it achieve its goals (Sanchez
et al., 1996).  Based on the above, in figure 1 we present a conceptual framework of
basic competence building and leveraging strategies employed by incumbents and
new entrants in the emerging on-line financial services complex.  Incumbents in this
framework are defined as large and mature players in the traditional financial services
industry (type 1).  We identify three generic types of new entrants.  First, we consider
players in industries other than the financial services industry that elaborate symbiotic
resource dependencies with incumbents (type 2).  Examples of this type of new
entrants are the software companies Microsoft and Intuit, which cooperate with
incumbent firms to build standardized customer interfaces.
                         -----------------------------------------------
Insert figure 1 about here
------------------------------------------------
7Autonomous outside ventures of incumbent players (type 3) are a second type of new
entrants.  A prominent example of this type of new entrants is Egg (www.egg.com),
the UK-based Internet banking division of Prudential Banking. Finally, we discern
brand new entrants (type 4) as the result of entrepreneurial efforts originating from
outside the traditional financial services industry.  Dublin-based First-e (www.first-
e.com), backed up by a consortium of venture capitalists and technology firms, is an
example of such a brand new entrant.   First-e, which is now active in the UK, Spain,
Germany and France, aims to be the first Internet bank to balance the global nature of
Internet-technology and the local demands of customers, on a European scale.  First-e
has therefore tied up with Spanish Uno-e, to create an entity called the Unofirst
Group.  The three types of new entrants described above are ideal types. Security First
Network Bank (www.sfnb.com), a US-based Internet bank set up in 1995 by Cardinal
Bancshares and SecureWare, represents a hybrid of these three types. Though SFNB
was taken over by Royal Bank Financial Group in 1998, it is interesting case-study
material since it pioneered Internet banking.  Egg and SFNB have already reached the
threshold number of one million customers (Clark & Lee, 1998; Mackintosh,
Financial Times, march 2000).
In this paper we assume that incumbent firms (type 1) – apart from engaging in
internal renewal (Baden-Fuller & Stopford, 1994) – have two strategic options when
trying to overcome their liability of oldness.  A first option is to elaborate
interdependent resource dependencies with players that already built complementary
competences in the marketspace (type 2).  Here the aim is to deploy combinatorial
competence building and leveraging strategies in an integrated marketplace and
marketspace.  Incumbents have an other option.  They can also establish fully
8autonomous outside ventures (type 3) in charge of independent competence building
in the marketspace, as a strategic option for future competence recombinations in an
integrated marketplace and marketspace.  We further assume that brand new entrants
(type 4) have to overcome their liability of newness by first leveraging existing
Internet-technology competences in the traditional financial services industry and
subsequently gradually building revolutionary competences in the marketspace.
Co-evolutionary perspectives
Banks have for most part of their history been unquestioned fiduciary parties, which
led out to the delimitation of legitimate spheres of organizational activity being
predominantly based on taken-for-granted social norms (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975;
Suchman, 1995).  Incumbent banks are structurally legitimate, in the sense that their
structures and procedures often serve as easily monitored proxies for less visible
targets of evaluation such as strategies, goals, outcomes (Meyer & Rowan, 1991;
Suchman, 1995).  Big banks’ status as “too big to fail”, and in some cases weak
incentives to be aggressive, resulted in the largest banking organizations in the
industry exerting a unique influence on competition (Pilloff, 1999). Banks, as they
grew larger, have literally become more of their environment (cf. Weick, 1979,
p.167).  Banks increasingly narrowed their focus on their own enactments of the
environment, causing a spiral of growing consensus on a restricted set of beliefs.
Consequently, dense social networks have been institutionalized in which an elite of
incumbent managers exchange the same recipe or set of beliefs (Spender, 1989,
1996).
9Incumbent bank managers therefore tend to view their organization as a closed
system, embedded in an environment they largely control, without perceiving they are
also for a large part new entrants in the Internet marketspace. The recent merger and
consolidation wave amongst financial services institutions in the US and Europe,
testifies to that (Brandman & Keeler, 2000).  The lack of contesting managerial
cognitions (Sanchez & Heene, 1997; Sanchez et al., 1996; Weick, 1979) induces
incumbents to conduct competitive organization policies towards customers,
technology, legitimacy and industry legacy in the same taken-for-granted way (Lewin
et al., 1999; Staw et al., 1981). Obviously, this narrowed perpective can lead to
serious misjudgments of situations when confronted with increasing environmental
turbulence (Janis, 1982).
New entrant managers on the contrary, tend to perceive their organization as an open
system, since they are not sufficiently embedded in existing social networks to control
environmental selection processes (Campbell,  1975; Weick, 1979). Figures 2a and 2b
illustrate the different perspectives of incumbents and new entrants on the boundaries
of the emerging on-line financial services complex.
                     ---------------------------------------------------------
                                 Insert figures 2 a and 2 b about here
                       ---------------------------------------------------------
New entrants try to embed themselves by building and participating in a brokerage
network, wherein flexible information access is prevalent.  In order to anticipate the
selective processes that delineate the boundaries of the emerging on-line financial
services complex, new entrant managers try to span these boundaries by creating
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resource interdependencies across several industry legacies, customer types and
legitimacy bases.  For instance Prudential’s outside venture Egg tries to overcome the
inherent second-utility nature of financial services, by linking its services to first-
utility products as wines, books, food and drink, CD’s, … (www.egg.com). Security
First Network Bank leveraged the banking industry expertise of Cardinal Bancshares
and the technical expertise of SecureWare, to not only sell Internet-only financial
services, but also develop secure customer interface software for incumbent banks
(Clark & Lee, 1998).
As noted by Campbell (1975) and Weick (1979), adaptive evolution focused on
processual change works best when the evolving social organization is a small part of
the total environment.  Hence, to anticipate environmental turbulence and the need for
changing resource dependencies, new entrants build a modular organization structure,
which allows maximal strategic flexibility.  First-e, for instance, leverages the ICT
and security skills of Enba to develop Internet-only financial services, contracts out its
clearing operations to Royal bank of Scotland PLC, and outsources its on-line
brokerage trades to the investment bank Dresdner Kleinwort Benson.  This allows
First-e to keep a modular structure, which allows flexible adaptation to environmental
turbulence.
However, new entrants eager to revolutionize an industry have to guard not to engage
in too much exploration and not enough exploitation.  New entrants face the danger of
falling in an exploration trap (Volberda, 1998). Although having flexible ties focused
on brokering opportunities is a powerful means for building superior competitive
advantage, the exploitation of this advantage can be endangered by not ensuring
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sufficiently strong ties with anchoring parties.   Incumbents on the other hand face the
opposite danger of engaging in too much exploitation and not enough exploration.
Incumbents face the danger of falling in an exploitation trap (Levinthal & March,
1993).  Although being too big or old to fail, and having a lot of dense
interconnections is a powerful premise in the short term, in the long run the lack of
flexible brokerage ties is likely to cause the decline of such incumbents.
By applying the above findings to the four organization types depicted in figure 1, we
can construct a continuum of  organizational characteristics.   We summarize all the
above findings in table 1.  In this table we map the above described organizational
characteristics on a continuum of the four organization types depicted in figure 1.
Players in industries other than the financial services industry– as they are engaged in
symbiotic resource dependencies with incumbents – are likely to adopt a rather closed
system perspective of the ongoing collaboration with the incumbents.   Autonomous
outside ventures of incumbent players are already more likely to adopt an open
system perspective of the environment and their organization since they can act fairly
independently from their originating incumbent.  Finally, brand new entrants, having
no links with incumbent players at all, are most likely to adopt an open system
perspective.
--------------------------------------------------
Insert table 1 about here.
--------------------------------------------------
Any of the above types, be it incumbents (1) or new entrants (2, 3 and 4), will have to
strike a balance between the open and closed systems perspective.  On the one hand
these organizations will have to keep part of the organization relatively closed to the
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environment to enable some rationality and planning.  On the other hand, to survive,
the organization will have to co-evolve with and enact the environment by keeping an
open system perspective.
Buffering and bridging : levers of a dynamic strategy
Managers, as boundary-spanners, in general serve two roles (Fennell & Alexander,
1987; Meznar & Nigh, 1995).  A first role is to buffer, or protect an organization from
the external environment. A second role is to serve as a bridge with the external
environment.  Basically, buffering strategies enable an organization to temporarily
seal off its core rationale from discontinuous turbulence.  In this way an organization
faced with increasing environmental turbulence, can maintain certain norms of
rationality while elaborating bridging strategies (Thompson, 1967). Bridging
strategies ensure the security of the entire organization in relation to its environment
in the longer term.  These strategies aim at bridging the gaps between organizations
and their exchange partners, competitors, regulators (Scott, 1998) and customers
through substantial organizational adaptation.   In the following sections we outline
the need for new entrants and incumbents to develop strategies of conjoint buffering
and bridging in order to build viable competences in the emerging on-line financial
services complex.
New entrants : how to overcome the liability of newness
A viable strategy of new entrants is likely to be directed towards revolutionary,
disruptive change in the environment.  This is especially true for brand new entrants
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(type 4), but also for autonomous ventures (type 3), as demonstrated by the start-up
Egg, which offers cut-throat interest rates on savings accounts (Mackintosh, Financial
Times, February 2000). However, upon embarking on a new line of activity,
particularly one with few precedents, new entrants have to face the daunting task of
winning legitimacy. Demonstrated technical superiority by new entrants is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for acquiring legitimacy in an  emerging on-line
financial services complex.  Apart from fulfilling this requirement early entrants must
also devote a substantial amount of energy to so-called “sector building” in the new
complex.  This involves creating a sense that the endeavours of the new entrants
define a sector that exists independent of particular incumbents (Aldrich & Fiol,
1994), by creating objectivity and exteriority.  Therefore, new entrants should follow
a double track of integrating new activities under the umbrella of preexisting taken-
for-granteds (cf. Zucker, 1983) and simultaneously disentangling new activities from
certain preexisting regimes, to avoid new activities being perceived as marginal or
illegitimate (Suchman, 1995).
The example of First-e illustrates this.  First-e piggybacks on the banking licence of
French Banque d’Escompte, to become the first legitimate pan-European bank
dedicated to Internet-only financial services (Rubin, 2000).  Moreover, to make an
impact, First-e rolled out a major ad campaign, encompassing TV, radio, print and
outdoor activity, a few months after its start-up (Rosier, 1999).  Likewise, Prudential
Banking established its outside venture and new Internet brand Egg, to prevent its
Internet-activities to be perceived as marginal and achieve a sense of exteriority about
its product offerings (www.egg.com).  Complementary outsiders (type 2) like
Microsoft take an apparently more closed system perspective.  Microsoft made it clear
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it does not want to launch itself as a financial services company, but only tie the
services on its Microsoft Network site up to major banks, to provide a stronger
proposition (Darby, 1999, Marketing).
The above examples illustrate Oliver’s (1992) proposition that the affiliation of a new
entrant to a legitimate institutional actor, for instance a governmental entity, has a
positive effect on its life chances, and even on the life chances of the whole focal
organization’s population.  In addition, several scholars have found that tying up to
legitimate actors not pertaining to the new entrants’ population, not only lowers the
liability of newness of new entrants, but also enhances their economic performance
(Podolny, 1993; Podolny & Philips, 1996; Sharfman et al., 1991).  These ties will also
help new entrants to create new allegiant constituencies. Legitimate actors in general
are (Hybels, 1995) the state (for instance contracts, regulation, legislation), the public
(f.i. lobbying instances), the financial community and the media. We introduce the
term “sponsor” for any of the legitimacy providers in the emerging on-line financial
services complex.   We define an inside sponsor to be a legitimacy provider in the
traditional financial services industry, while an outside sponsor in our definition is a
legitimacy provider not pertaining to the traditional financial industry.
First-e, for instance, uses Banque d’Escompte as an inside sponsor, by leveraging its
banking license.  On the other hand, First-e uses its parent firm Enba and venture
capitalists such as Intel as outside sponsors.  In addition, First-e is investing a huge
amount of money to establish a brand name.  Extensive media coverage in both the
traditional financial services press and the computer or software press, is contributing
to First-e’s publicity (Rosier, Marketing, 1999).  The significance of Egg’s tie to the
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banking license of its parent company and inside sponsor Prudential Banking is
obvious.  Moreover, Egg’s launch of a web-based personal investment supermarket in
which incumbents as Prudential and Legal & General offer their products, provides it
with an other source of inside legitimation.  Moreover, to ascertain outside
legitimation, Egg initiated a virtual community for its customers
(www.eggfreezone.com), in which independent or “exterior” media sources provide
“objective” information about the financial services world.  To further improve the
credibility of this information, customers are encouraged to post all their griefs and
complaints on a publicly available webpage.   Egg’s linkages to and discounts on a
whole range of first utility products offered on the Internet, further contribute to its
outside legitimation.
The example of SFNB provides us with another illustration of the importance of
inside and outside sponsors for new entrant firms.  Some months after its startup,
three new banking company investors took a participation of 25 % in SFNB.  One of
these investors, Wachovia, was regarded as a very conservative and well run bank
holding company.  SFNB’s link to Wachovia provided it with an important source of
inside legitimation, and even suggested that Internet banking could be seriously
considered by conservative banks (Clark & Lee, 1998).  SecureWare’s highly
regarded banking software - which later on even became a standard for US-banks -
further added to SFNB’s outside legitimation (Clark & Lee, 1998).
According to Hybels (1995 : 241; italics added) “the institutionalisation of a feature of
society derives from a legitimation process that occurs over time, and the legitimation
process itself derives largely from institutions other than that being legitimated.”  Two
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aspects of the statement are important here; the time aspect and the notion that
existing institutions provide support in the legimation process of new institutions,
although this could mean cannibalizing their own legitimacy.  Consequently, new
entrants that try to build new competences fast by using inside and outside sponsors
are more likely to disrupt the competence perspective of incumbents.  The superior
pace of new entrants is likely to outperform the adaptive capabilities of incumbents.
In this way new entrants decrease the probability that incumbents control the
changing environment in which they are embedded.  As a consequence, the set of
beliefs of industry incumbents is likely to become less homogeneous, which increases
the probability that some incumbents will change their perspective on legitimacy
criteria.  The support of incumbents that are willing to cannibalize their traditional
legitimacy perspectives in favour of a new legitimation process evidently suits new
entrants’ interests.  In particular because this support is indispensable in quickly
attaining a critical mass of de-institutionalizing participants in the on-line financial
services complex.  Based on the above findings and the condition that new entrants
are technically superior in the marketspace, we suggest following propositions  :
Proposition 1 :   By using the buffer of an inside sponsor, an early new entrant
decreases the “liability of newness” of all the new entrants, and subsequently induces
incumbents to adapt their competences in a disruptive way, which facilitates bridging
strategies.
Proposition 2  :   Using a combination of inside sponsors and outside sponsors
enables faster profitability and faster competence building in the marketspace
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When evaluating different strategies both in the marketplace and the marketspace, we
need to consider the type and degree of legitimating ties provided by the different
sponsors.  Most outside sponsors will eventually help in creating new legitimacy in
the marketspace, but do not provide entrants with a strong initial legitimacy-basis to
overcome their liability of newness in the marketplace. Conversely, most inside
sponsors can help new entrants in gaining relatively strong institutionalized
legitimacy in the marketplace, but do not provide entrants with the support of creating
new legitimacy in the marketspace.  New entrants therefore need to manage the
tension between the flexibility of outside sponsors and the security provided by inside
sponsors.  Clark and Lee’s (1998) case-study of Security First Network Bank revealed
the importance of managing this tension.  SFNB’s immediate success with its secure
software made it hesitate in which direction to proceed : either be an Internet-bank
providing disruptive Internet-only financial services, or be a software company selling
off its software packages to incumbent players (Clark & Lee, 1998).  In this respect
SFNB’s modest successes as an Internet bank and its later takeover by the Royal Bank
Financial Group, could well be attributed to its lack of focus on continued change and
flexibility toward outside sponsors, and its premature profit-seeking toward
incumbent insiders.
Incumbents : how to overcome the liability of oldness
One of the first and most standardized steps of incumbents in the marketspace was the
comprehensive installation of an automated teller machine (ATM) network. However,
this was not a strategically aligned step, as the CEO of Wells Fargo stated (Global
Finance, 2000 : 70) : “over the past decades banking technology has preceded a
18
change in customer habits, in many cases solutions preceding demand, like ATM’s
installed before widespread consumer acceptance.  And over time banking technology
has actually disconnected the customer from the bank and impaired the bank’s ability
to create customer intimacy.”  Rayport and Sviokla (1994) point out that while the
ATM network continued to expand, bank customers began responding to the ATM
technology and not to the individual bank providing it.  This made banks the faceless
providers of commodities.  Because bankers originally only saw the ATM network as
a banking automation, they did not notice that such automation would change the
entire value proposition of retail banking (Rayport & Sviokla, 1994).
Contrary to new entrants, incumbents tend to prefer evolutionary change, which is
reflected by a desire to control the changes of the environment in which they are
embedded.  However, incumbents have to understand that they also are for a large
part new entrants in the marketspace.  How can incumbents bridge sources of
environmental turbulence, and at the same time protect past accomplishments?
Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that often peripheral activities are ceremonialized for
external legitimacy purposes and are loosely coupled to the technical core, because
they do not offer consistent guidelines to manage it.  This decoupling could be
particularily useful when there are conflicting demands by the environment.
Moreover, Meyer (1979) notes that structural changes are often signals to external
constituencies of organizational commitment regardless as to whether the new
structure is effective or implemented.   These propositions confirm the need for
incumbents to establish buffering strategies to ensure maintenance of their embedded
competences towards exchange partners, competitors, regulators and customers.
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The Internet websites of many incumbent banks are an example of such a buffering
strategy (e.g. www.abnamro.com and www.natwest.com).  Their establishment has
substantial normative significance, but limited strategic consequences; Internet is still
mainly treated as an additional distribution channel, instead of the driver of a
comprehensive processual change.  What is more, to buffer themselves from
environmental turbulence, incumbent banks like for instance Barclays and ABN-
Amro “shrug off the threat of internet competition” (Graham, Financial Times, 16
february 2000, p.24) or discredit “the marketing skills” and “customer relationships”
(Fairlamb, BusinessWeek Online, 25 october 1999, p.2) of new entrant firms.
Meanwhile however, the incumbent banks announce themselves huge e-commerce
investments (Bell, Marketing, 27 may 1999).
Yet, buffering strategies should be used with caution.  Incumbents’ inertia towards
building processual competences in the marketspace might lead to a strategic drift
(Johnson, 1987) of symbolic buffering strategies without effective operationalization
of bridging strategies.   This could eventually lead to a widening gap between
organizational beliefs and environmental characteristics, and, as a consequence, the
gradual de-institutionalization of incumbents’ structural legitimacy.  Incumbents
willing to develop effective bridging strategies should make use of new boundary-
spanning personnel, to enable contesting managerial cognitions to remould the
strategic logic of the organization.  Incumbents may therefore establish specific
subunits with a mandate to question others’ taken-for-grantedness. “Where
organizations seek to perceive changing audience beliefs, the risk is not that
centrifugal forces will lead boundary spanners to run wild, but rather that centripetal
forces will lead them to become lapdogs” (Suchman, 1995 : 586).  These propositions
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seem to confirm Christensen’s (1997, 2000) findings, that the only way for a mature
business to harness a disruptive technology like the Internet, is to start an autonomous
business unit independent of the extant resource dependencies of the mature business.
For instance the establishment by Prudential banking of its outside venture Egg needs
to be considered in light of the above findings.
Ideally, the scope of an outside venture should not interfere with incumbents’ prime
product-market combinations so as to not to put in danger incumbents’ controlled
embeddedness.  Egg for instance offers products in the UK that are not directly in
competition with Prudential’s main product offer. In this way, incumbents might be
able to avoid cannibalization (Ghemawhat, 1991) of their product-market
combinations.  In addition, the know-how acquired in the Internet marketspace by the
outside venture can facilitate committed (Ghemawhat, 1991) competence building and
exploration in the incumbents’ organizations.  For instance, Lloyds plans to first
launch an e-bank in Spain and only afterwards in its main market, the UK.  This
illustrates Lloyd’s commitment to incrementally build competences in the
marketspace (Anonymous, Financial Times, may 2000).
Summarized briefly, incumbents’ managers should try to acquire flexible skills
(Volberda, 1998) resulting out of contesting managerial cognitions, to effectively
strike a balance between the protection of buffering strategies and incremental
operationalization of bridging strategies.  In this way incumbents’ managers might be
able to avoid increasing contradictions between the legitimation of their organization
in on the one hand the traditional financial services marketplace and on the other hand
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the Internet marketspace.  Based on the above findings, we suggest following
proposition  :
Proposition 3 :   By using the buffer of outside sponsors and the bridge of
autonomous processes in the marketspace, incumbents are more likely to maintain
legitimacy and competences and decrease their liability of oldness
Lessons on co-evolution in emerging e-commerce complexes
A one-sided interpretation of the current evolutions in the emerging on-line financial
services complex as cut-throat competition between incumbent and new entrant firms
is not likely to shed much light on how to build and leverage competences in the
Internet marketspace.  Establishing a competitive advantage in the Internet
marketspace is not solely a question of incumbents being large enough to crush
fledgling new entrants, or – vice versa – of new entrants being revolutionary enough
to render incumbents’ business models obsolete and illegitimate.  On the contrary, the
strongest business models in an on-line financial services complex will build on
complementarities between traditional financial services competences and
revolutionary Internet-competences. Therefore, cooperation between incumbents and
new entrants rather than mere competition will be the key to success, both for new
entrants and incumbents.  New entrants and incumbents need to co-evolve with each
others’ competences to some extent to build a competitive advantage – a critical, and
sustainable mass of profitable customers.  Naturally, strategies to trigger cooperation
of other parties to one’s own favour differ for the various players in the emerging on-
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line financial services complex.  In addition, it is important to keep in mind that
cooperation between different players is not always triggered directly, but often
comes into being indirectly through institutional pressure exerted by the media, the
state, banking industry analysts, competitors and other members of the financial
community.
In this paper we distinguished between four organizational types as key players in the
emerging on-line financial services complex, namely incumbents (type 1),
complementary outsiders (type 2), autonomous venture (type 3) and brand new
entrants (type 4).  We deduce the following important managerial implications for
incumbents (type 1) :
·  incumbents – apart from engaging in gradual internal renewal – need to break away
from their institutionalized way of thinking by appealing to outside  managerial views
·  to that end incumbents have two options (which are not mutually exclusive) :
a) set up resource interdependencies with one or more complementary
outsiders
b) establish an autonomous venture in the Internet marketspace,
which does not interfere with the prime product/market
combinations of the parent company in a first stage
·  anyway, incumbents need to use sponsors in the Internet marketspace, like 
for instance the media reporting on on-line financial services evolutions, to 
establish a buffer against immediate disruptive competition and to avoid untimely
obsolescence or cannibalization of their core product/market combinations
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·  meanwhile, incumbents need to gradually establish bridging strategies towards the
changing perspectives of customers, the state, the media and other members of the
financial community
·  therefore, incumbents need to rely on autonomous processes in the Internet 
marketspace – by means of an autonomous venture or an autonomous 
collaboration with a complementary outsider – in order to stay in touch with 
revolutionary evolutions introduced by new entrants
With regards to new entrants, we emphasize the need to simultaneously use linkages
to players in the traditional financial services industry – inside sponsors – and
sponsors in the Internet marketspace – outside sponsors – to overcome the liability of
newness they are confronted with.   Important to note is that the emergence of an on-
line financial services complex is a collective process, and thus not only relies on
revolutionary business propositions, but also on reaching a threshold of sufficient
cooperation with other players.  In order of increasing revolutionary perspective we
deduce the following managerial implications for new entrants :
·  complementary outsiders (type 2) :
a) need to focus on control of the customer interface as the most important
lever for future competitive advantage in the Internet marketspace, which
is characterized by interactive supplier-customer processes
b) need to achieve a critical mass of resource interdependencies with key
players in the emerging on-line financial services complex to ensure that
controlling the customer interface is valuable enough
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·  autonomous ventures (type 3) :
a) need to operate as independent as possible of their parent company – in
this paper by definition an incumbent firm – to be able to build viable
Internet competences and a profitable business model (this also translates
in a new brand name and a differentiated use of marketing channels)
b) nevertheless to some extent need to coordinate their processes with the
internal renewal processes of the parent company, to obtain succesful
synergies in the longer term
·  brand new entrants (type 4) :
a) are most prone to develop revolutionary managerial views in the short
term, since they are not connected to incumbent players
b) in order to balance this revolutionary tendency with sufficient cooperation
of more conservative players, new entrants need to establish ties with
inside sponsors, by for instance getting a banking license or hiring “inside
managers” with sufficient insight and relations in the traditional financial
services industry
The above lessons might help incumbents and new entrants considerably in
influencing which competences will be viable and legitimate in the emerging on-line
financial services complex.  However, this does not mean that the final outcomes of
either party’s managerial actions will be exactly the ones expected. We therefore
highlight the importance of continually keeping a dynamic, co-evolutionary
perspective of environmental change.  In this way, incumbents and new entrants can
avoid entrenching their competences untimely in an e-commerce complex which has
not yet reached a threshold of sufficient maturity.
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          FIGURE 1
    Generic competence building and leveraging strategies :
    Incumbent firms and three generic types of new entrants
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    TABLE 1
Continuum of organizational characteristics of incumbents and three generic
types of new entrants
Incumbents
(type 1)
Complementary
outsider
(type 2)
Autonomous
venture
(type 3)
Brand new
entrant
(type 4)
Organizational
structure
---too big/old to fail-------------------------------------------------modular--------
System
perspective
----closed -----------------------------------------------------------open----------
Change ---evolution--------------------------------------------------------revolution---------
Embeddedness ---controlled-----------------------------------------------------interdependent-----
Managerial
cognitions
---uniform / elitist---------------------------------------contesting / democratic---
Liability of
----oldness-----------------------------------------------------------newness----
(competence trap)                                                             (exploration trap)
Legitimacy
Customers
ICT
------structural------------------------------------------------------processual-----
taken-for-grantedness                                                            enactment
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